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1Abstract
We study strategic voting after weakening the notion of strategy-proofness to
Ordinal Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (OBIC). Under OBIC, truthtelling
is required to maximize the expected utility of every voter, expected utility
being computed with respect to the voter’s prior beliefs and under the as-
sumption that everybody else is also telling the truth. We show that for a
special type of priors i.e., the uniform priors there exists a large class of social
choice functions that are OBIC. However, for priors which are generic in the
set of independent beliefs a social choice function is OBIC only if it is dic-
tatorial. This result underlines the robustness of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem.
21 Introduction
In the classical model of strategic voting, each voter knows his own preferences but
is ignorant of the preferences of other voters. The objectives of the social planner
are represented by a social choice function which associates a feasible alternative
with every proﬁle of voter preferences. Voters are fully aware of their strategic
opportunities; by making diﬀerent announcements of their preferences, they can
inﬂuence the alternative that is selected. The goal of the planner is to select a social
choice function which gives voters appropriate incentives to reveal their private
information truthfully. It is clear the choice of equilibrium concept is critical. The
concept which has been preponderant in the literature is strategy-proofness. This
requires truth-telling for each voter to be a dominant strategy. In other words,
each voter cannot do better by deviating from the truth irrespective of what he
believes the other voters will announce. This is clearly a demanding requirement.
And this intuition is conﬁrmed by the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
which states that under mild assumptions, the only social choice functions which
are strategy-proof are dictatorial. A dictatorial social choice function is one which
always selects the maximal element of a particular voter (who is the dictator). It
is quite clear that this is a powerful negative result.
Our objective in this paper is to analyse the implications of weakening the
truth-telling requirement from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive-
compatibility. This notion was introduced in d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) in
the context of a diﬀerent problem, that of the representation of committees. It is
the obvious adaptation to voting theory of the notion of incentive-compatibility
which is widely used in standard incentive theory (for instance, in the theory
of auctions). Truth-telling is required to maximize the expected utility of each
voter. This expected utility is computed with reference to the voter’s prior beliefs
about the (possible) preferences of the other voters and based on the assumption
3that other voters follow the truth-telling strategy. More formally, truth-telling is
required to be a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct revelation game, modeled
as a game of incomplete information. Since social choice functions depend only
on voters’ ranking of various alternatives, truth-telling is required to maximize
expected utility for every representation of the voter’s true ranking.
Ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatibility is a signiﬁcant weakening of the truth-
telling requirement. Note that whether or not a social choice function satisﬁes or-
dinal Bayesian incentive-compatibility depends on the beliefs of each voter. It sat-
isﬁes strategy-proofness only if it satisﬁes ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatibility
with respect to all beliefs of each voter. However, we are able to prove the following.
Assume that voters have have a common prior that is independently distributed.
There is a set of beliefs C which is generic in the set of all independently distributed
beliefs such that a social choice function is ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible
with respect to any belief in C, only if it is dictatorial. Of course, we assume that
there are at least three alternatives and that all social choice functions under con-
sideration satisfy the mild requirement of unanimity.
Our result underlines the extraordinary robustness of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem. For “almost all” beliefs, the weaker requirement of ordinal Bayesian
incentive-compatibility is suﬃcient to force dictatorship. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem is, of course, a corollary of our result but the latter also provides a precise
picture (in the space of beliefs), of how pervasive the dictatorship problem is.
The negative generic result requires a very important qualiﬁcation. A signiﬁ-
cant non-generic case is the one where each voters’ beliefs about the preferences of
the others is a uniform distribution. This is an important case in decision theory
and is the so-called case of “complete ignorance”. A dramatically diﬀerent picture
emerges here. We provide a weak suﬃcient condition for a social choice function
to be ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible and show that a variety of well-
behaved social choice functions do satisfy this condition (for instance, selections
4from scoring correspondences). The overall picture is therefore complex and nu-
anced. Generically, ordinal Bayesian incentive-compatibility implies dictatorship
but in non-generic cases which are of considerable interest, signiﬁcant possibility
results exist.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set out the basic notation
and deﬁnitions. In Sections 3 and 4, we consider respectively the case of uniform
priors and the generic case. We discuss our results in Section 5 while Section 6
concludes. The proof of the main result is contained in the Appendix.
2 Notation and Deﬁnitions
The set N = {1,···,N} is the set of voters or individuals. The set of outcomes
is the set A with |A| = m. Elements of A will be denoted by a,b,c,d etc. Let
I P denote the set of strict orderings1 of the elements of A. A typical preference
ordering will be denoted by Pi where aPib will signify that a is preferred (strictly) to
b under Pi. A preference proﬁle is an element of the set I P N. Preference proﬁles will
be denoted by P, ¯ P,P 0 etc and their i-th components as Pi, ¯ Pi,P 0
i respectively with
i = 1,···,N. Let ( ¯ Pi,P−i) denote the preference proﬁle where the i-th component
of the proﬁle P is replaced by ¯ Pi.
For all Pi ∈ I P and k = 1,···,M, let rk(Pi) denote the k th ranked alternative
in Pi, i.e., rk(Pi) = a implies that |{b 6= a|bPia}| = k − 1.
Definition 2.1 A Social Choice Function or (SCF) f is a mapping f : I P N → A.
A SCF can be thought of as representing the objectives of a planner, or equiv-
alently, that of society as a whole. An important observation in the context of our
paper is that we assume SCFs to be ordinal. In other words, the only information
1A strict ordering is a complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation
5used for determining the value of an SCF are the rankings of each individual over
feasible alternatives. This is a standard assumption in voting theory.
Throughout the paper, we assume that SCFs under consideration satisfy the
axiom of unaninimty. This is an extremely weak assumption which states that in
any situation where all individuals agree on some alternative as the best, then the
SCF must respect this consensus. More formally,
Definition 2.2 A SCF f is unanimous if f(P) = aj whenever aj = r1(Pi) for
all individuals i ∈ N.
We assume that an individual’s preference ordering is private information.
Therefore SCFs have to be designed in a manner such that all individuals have
the “correct” incentives to reveal their private information. It has been standard
in the strategic voting literature to require that SCFs are strategy-proof, i.e. they
provide incentives for truth-telling behaviour in dominant strategies. A strategy-
proof SCF has the property that no individual can strictly gain by misrepresenting
his preferences, no matter what preferences are announced by other individuals.
Definition 2.3 A SCF f is strategy-proof if there does not exist i ∈ N, Pi,P 0
i ∈
I P, and P−i ∈ I P N−1, such that
f(P 0
i,P−i)Pif(Pi,P−i)
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem characterizes the class of SCFs which are
strategy-proof and unanimous. This is the class of dictatorial SCFs.
Definition 2.4 A SCF f is dictatorial if there exists an individual i such that,
for all proﬁles P we have f(P) = r1(Pi).
Theorem 2.1 Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975)
Assume m ≥ 3. A SCF is unanimous and strategy-proof if and only if it is
dictatorial.
6In this paper, we explore the consequences of weakening the incentive require-
ment for SCFs from strategy-proofness to ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility.
This concept originally appeared in d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) and we describe
it formally below.
Definition 2.5 A belief for an individual i is a probability distribution on the set




We assume that all individuals have a common prior belief µ. Clearly µ belongs
to the unit simplex of dimension m!
N − 1. For all µ, for all P−i and Pi, we shall
let µ(P−i|Pi) denote the conditional probability of P−i given Pi. The conditional
probability µ(P−i|Pi) belongs to the unit simplex of dimension m!N−1 − 1
Definition 2.6 The utility function u : A → < represents Pi ∈ I P, if and only if
for all a,b ∈ A,
aPib ⇔ u(a) > u(b)
We will denote the set of utility functions representing Pi by U(Pi).
We can now deﬁne the notion of incentive compatibility that we use in the
paper.
Definition 2.7 A SCF f is Ordinally Bayesian Incentice Compatible (OBIC)
with respect to the belief µ if for all i ∈ N, for all Pi ,P 0










Let f be a SCF and consider the following game of incomplete information as
formulated originally in Harsanyi (1967). The set of players is the set N. The set
of types for a player is the set I P which is also the set from which a player chooses
7an action. If player i’s type is Pi, and if the action-tuple chosen by the players is
P 0, then player i’s payoﬀ is u(f(P 0)) where u is a utility function which represents
Pi. Player i’s beliefs are given by the probability distribution µ. The SCF f is
OBIC if truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this game. Since SCF’s un-
der consideration are ordinal by assumption, there is no “natural” utility function
for expected uility calculations. Under these circumstances, OBIC requires that a
player cannot gain in expected utility (conditional on type) by unilaterally misrep-
resenting his preferences no matter what utility function is used to represent his
true preferences.
It is clear that strategy-proofness is a more stringent requirement than OBIC
with respect to a particular belief. We record without proof the precise relationship
between the two concepts below.
Remark 2.1 A SCF is strategy-proof if and only it is OBIC with respect to
all beliefs µ.
It is possible to provide an alternative deﬁnition of OBIC in terms of stochastic
dominance. Let f be a SCF and pick an arbitrary individual i and a preference
ordering Pi. Suppose alternative a is ﬁrst-ranked under Pi. Let α denote the
probability conditional on Pi that a is the outcome when i announces Pi assuming
that other players are truthful as well. Thus α is the sum of µ(P−i|Pi) over all P−i
such that f(Pi,P−i) = a. Similarly, let β be the probability that a is the outcome if
he announces P 0
i, i.e β is the sum of µ(P−i|Pi) over all P−i such that f(P 0
i,P−i) = a.
If f is OBIC with respect to µ then we must have α ≥ β. Suppose this is false.
Then there exists a utility function which gives a utility of one to a and virtually
zero to all other outcomes which represents Pi and such that the expected utility
from announcing the truth for agent i with preferences Pi is strictly lower than
8from announcing P 0
i. Using a similar argument, it follows that the probability
of obtaining the ﬁrst k ranked alternatives k = 1,···,m according to Pi under
truthtelling must be at least as great as under misreporting via P 0
i. We make these
ideas precise below.
For all i ∈ N, for any Pi ∈ I P and for any a ∈ A, let B(a,Pi) = {b ∈
A|bPia} ∪ {a}. Thus B(a,Pi) is the set of alternatives that are weakly preferred
to a under Pi.
Definition 2.8 The SCF f is OBIC with respect to the belief µ if for all i ∈ N,





i,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi)}|Pi) (2)
We omit the proof of the equivalence of the two deﬁnitions of OBIC. The proof
is easy and we refer the interested reader to Theorem 3.11 in d’Aspremont and
Peleg (1988).
3 Uniform Priors
We begin by analyzing the case of uniform priors. Our objective is to provide a
weak suﬃcient condition for OBIC with respect to this prior. Although we shall
demonstrate in the next section that this possibility result disappears if the prior
is perturbed, it is nevertheless of interest because of the importance of uniform
priors in decision theory.
Assumption 3.1 For all i, for all Pi, P 0
i and for all P−i and P 0
−i, we have
µ(P−i|Pi) = µ(P 0
−i|P 0
i)
9We denote these uniform beliefs by ¯ µ. Restating Deﬁnition 2.8 in the present
context, we have
Proposition 3.1 The SCF f is OBIC with respect to the belief ¯ µ if, for all i,
for all integers k = 1,···,m, for all Pi and P 0
i, we have
|{P−i|f(Pi,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi)}| ≥ |{P−i|f(P
0
i,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi}| (3)
We omit the (trivial) proof of this Proposition. It will be convenient to express
equation (3) in a more compact way. For all Pi ∈ I P and x ∈ A, let
η(x,Pi) ≡ |{P−i|f(Pi,P−i) = x}|
Equation (3) can now be expressed as follows. For all i, for all integers k =










We now give an example of a non-dictatorial SCF which is OBIC with respect
to ¯ µ.
EXAMPLE 3.1
Let A = {a,b,c}, N = {1,2}. Consider the SCF deﬁned below.
10abc acb bac bca cab cba
abc a a a b c a
acb a a b a a c
bac b a b b b c
bca a b b b c b
cab a c c b c c
cba c a b c c c
(5)
In the array above, individual 1’s preferences appear along the rows and indi-
vidual 2’s along the columns. The SCF is well-behaved; in particular it is neutral
(this will be deﬁned shortly), non-dictatorial and Pareto eﬃcient. To verify that it
is OBIC with respect to ¯ µ, it suﬃces to observe that for each preference ordering
of an individual, the frequency of occurence of its ﬁrst-ranked alternative is four
and of its second and third-ranked alternatives, one each respectively. It is easy
to modify the example slightly in order to obtain a SCF which is anonymous (i.e.
invariant with respect to the permutation of individuals). Details may be found in
Majumdar (2002), Chapter 2.
We introduce some deﬁnitions which are required for the main result of this
section.
Definition 3.1 Let σ : A → A be a permutation of A. Let P σ denote the proﬁle
(P σ
1 ,···,P σ
N) where for all i and for all a,b ∈ A,
aPib ⇒ σ(a)P σ
i σ(b)
The SCF f satisﬁes neutrality if, for all proﬁles P and for all permutation functions
σ, we have
11f(P σ) = σ[f(P)]
Neutrality is a standard requirement for social choice functions and correspon-
dences (see for e.g. Moulin (1983)). All alternatives are treated symmentrically in
neutral SCFs i.e. the “names” of the alternatives do not matter.
Let Pi be an ordering and let a ∈ A. We say that P 0
i represents an elementary
a-improvement of Pi if
• for all x,y ∈ A \ {a}, xPiy ⇔ xP 0
iy
• [a = rk(Pi)] ⇒ [a = rk−1(P 0
i)], if k > 1
• [a = r1(Pi)] ⇒ [a = r1(P 0
i)]
Definition 3.2 The SCF f satisﬁes elementary monotonicity if for all i, Pi,P 0
i
and P−i
[f(Pi,P−i) = a and P 0
i represents an a-elementary improvement of Pi] ⇒
[f(P 0
i,P−i) = a]
Let P be a proﬁle where the outcome is a. Suppose a moves up one place in
some individual’s ranking without disturbing the relative positions of any other
alternative. Then elementary monotonicity requires a to be the outcome at the
new proﬁle. This is relatively weak axiom whose implications we will discuss more
fully after stating and proving the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.1 A SCF which satisﬁes neutrality and elementary monotonicity is
OBIC with respect to ¯ µ.
Proof: Let f be a SCF which is neutral and satisﬁes elementary monotonicity.
We will show that it is OBIC with respect to ¯ µ.
12Our ﬁrst step is to show that the neutrality of f implies that, for all i, for all
integers k = 1,···,m and for all Pi and P 0
i, we have η(rk(Pi),Pi) = η(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i).
Pick an individual i and orderings Pi and P 0
i. Deﬁne a permutation function on A
as follows: for all integers k = 1,···,m,
σ(rk(Pi)) = rk(P 0
i)
Observe that P σ
i = P 0
i. Fix an integer k ∈ {1,···,m}. Let P−i be such that





−i) = σ[f(Pi,P−i)] = σ[rk(Pi)] = rk(P
0
i) (6)
Equation (6) above establishes that
η(rk(Pi),Pi) ≤ η(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i).
By using the permutation σ−1, the argument above can be replicated to prove the
reverse inequality.
The next step in the proof is to show that for all i, for all integers k = 1,···,m−
1, and for all Pi,
η(rk(Pi) ≥ η(rk+1(Pi))
Pick i, k ∈ {1,···,m − 1} and Pi. Let P 0
i be an elementary rk+1(Pi)-improvement
of Pi. Since f satisﬁes elementary monotonicity, we must have
{P−i|f(Pi,P−i) = rk+1(Pi)} ⊆ {P−i|f(P
0
i,P−i) = rk+1(Pi)} (7)
Equation (7) above implies that
η(rk+1(Pi),P
0
i) ≥ η(rk+1(Pi),Pi) (8)
But the LHS of equation (8) equals η(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i) which from the ﬁrst part of the
proof, equals η(rk(Pi),Pi). This proves our claim. Observe that this claim implies
that
η(rk(Pi),Pi) ≥ η(rt(Pi),Pi) whenever k < t (9)
13We now complete the proof of the Theorem. Let i be an individual, let k ∈
{1,···,m} be an integer and let Pi and P 0
i be orderings. Let T = {s|rs(P 0
i) =






















so that f is OBIC with respect to ¯ µ.
Theorem 3.1 is a positive result. Neutrality and Elementary Monotonicity are
relatively weak requirements for SCFs to satisfy. We provide an important class
of examples below.
EXAMPLE 3.2 (Scoring Correspondences)
Let s ≡ (s1,s2,···,sm) be a vector in I Rm with the property that s1 ≥ s2 ≥
···,≥ sm and s1 > sm. Let P be a proﬁle. The score assigned to alternative a in
P by individual i is sk if rk(Pi) = a. The aggregate score of a in P is the sum of
its individual scores in P. Let Ws(P) denote the set of alternatives whose scores in
P are maximal. The social choice correspondence W deﬁned by this procedure is
called a scoring correspondence and is discussed in greater detail in Moulin (1983).
Important correspondences which belong to this class are the plurality and the
Borda correspondences.
We deﬁne a SCF f which is a selection from W in the following manner. For
all proﬁles P, f(P) is the alternative in Ws(P) which is maximal according to P1,
14i.e. it is the element in the set Ws(P) which is the highest ranked in individual 1’s
preferences. Observe that f is neutral. We also claim that it satisﬁes elementary
monotonicity. To see this, suppose f(P) = a and let P 0
i be an a-improvement of Pi
for some individual i. Observe that the score of a in P 0
i increases relative to that in
Pi while that of the other alternatives either remains constant or falls. Therefore
the aggregate score of a in the proﬁle (P 0
i,P−i) is strictly greater than in P while
that of the other alternatives is either the same or less. Therefore Ws(P 0
i,P−i)) =
{a} = f(P 0
i,P−i) and elementary monotonicity is satisﬁed. Theorem 3.1 allows to
conclude that f is OBIC with respect to ¯ µ. Indeed any neutral selection from a
scoring correspondence will satisfy this property.
Moulin (1983) contains a more extensive discussion of elementary monotonicity
(which he calls monotonicity). He shows (Chapter 3, Lemma 1) that in addition
to scoring correspondences, Condorcet-type correspondences (those which select
majority winners whenever they exist) such as the Copeland and Kramer rules,
the Top-cycle and the uncovered set, all satisfy elementary monotonicity. It is easy
to show that a neutral selection of these correspondences obtained, for instance, by
breaking ties in the manner of the previous example (using the preference ordering
of a given individual), generates a SCF which is OBIC with respect to ¯ µ.
Remark 3.1 Theorem 3.1 only provides a suﬃcient condition for a SCF to be
OBIC with respect to ¯ µ. In order to see this observe that the SCF in Example
3.1 is neutral but violates elementary monotonicity. For instance, observe that
f(abc,cba) = a but f(abc,cab) = c.
Remark 3.2 There are SCFs which are not OBIC with respect to ¯ µ. Consider,
for example the SCF which always picks individual 1’s second-ranked alternative.
15It is clearly neutral. But it violates equation (4).
4 The Generic Case
The main result of this section is to show that the possibility results of the previous
section do not hold generally. However we need to make a crucial assumption
regarding admissible beliefs.
Assumption 4.1 All admissible beliefs µ are independent, i.e. for all k =




We denote the set of all independent priors by ∆I. The set ∆I is the N-th
order Cartesian product of unit simplices ∆, where each ∆ is of dimension m!−1.
We can now state the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1 Let m ≥ 3 and assume that beliefs are independent. There exists a
subset C of ∆I such that
• C is open and dense in ∆I
• ∆I − C has Lebesgue measure zero
• if f is unanimous and is OBIC w.r.t µ where µ ∈ C, then f is dictatorial.
The theorem states that there is a subset of the set of independent beliefs which
is generic in the latter set which has the property that every unanimous SCF which
is OBIC with respect to any belief in this set, is dictatorial. We emphasize that
the genericity is in the set of independently generated beliefs and not in the space
of all probability distribution of types.
The proof of the theorem is contained in the Appendix.
16Remark 4.1 Theorem 4.1 can easily be extended to cover the case where
voters do not have common beliefs. Here OBIC has to be deﬁned with respect to
an N-tuple of beliefs or a belief system. If the belief of each voter is assumed to
be independent, then there exists a set of beliefs for each voter with the following
property: every unanimous SCF which is OBIC with respect to a belief system
where each voter’s belief is picked arbitrarily from this set must be dictatorial.
In addition, the same genericity properties hold for these sets of beliefs. The
arguments required to prove this result are virtually identical to those in the paper.
There is however a sense in which this result is more general than the one in the
common priors case. We no longer need to assume independence of each voter’s
beliefs in the case where there are more than two voters - the weaker assumption
of free beliefs introduced in d’Aspremont and G´ erard-Varet (1982) suﬃces. The
common prior assumption in conjunction with free beliefs implies that the common
prior satisﬁes independence. Results relating to the non-common priors case can
be found in Majumdar (2002) Chapter 2.
Remark 3.2 The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem is a corollary of Theorem
4.1. This follows immediately from Remark 2.1.
5 Discussion
In this section we attempt to provide some insight into our results. In order to
do so we return to the two person, three alternative SCF described in Example
3. Assume that the common belief is independent; in particular let µ1,µ2,···,µ6
denote the row voter’s belief that the preferences of the column voter’s preferences
(types) are abc,acb,···,cba respectively.
Suppose that the row voter’s true ordering is abc and she considers misrep-
resenting her preferences by announcing acb. Observe that by telling the truth,
17she obtains a with probability µ1 + µ2 + µ3 + µ6 while by lying, she gets a with
probability µ1 + µ2 + µ4 + µ5. We claim that OBIC requires that
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 + µ6 ≥ µ1 + µ2 + µ4 + µ5
Suppose that the inequality does not hold, i.e. the quantity on the right hand side
strictly exceeds that on the left hand side. Then there exists a cardinalization of
abc where u(a) = 1, u(b) = δ > 0 and u(c) = 0 with δ suﬃciently small such that
the expected utility from truth telling is strictly smaller than that from lying via
acb.
Now suppose that the row voter’s true preference is acb and she considers
lying by announcing abc. Replicating the argument above, we obtain the reverse
inequality. (Note that in order to make this claim, we are making use of the
independence assumption). Combining the two inequalities, we have
µ1 + µ2 + µ3 + µ6 = µ1 + µ2 + µ4 + µ5
This equality does hold in the uniform prior case where both left and right
hand side are equal to 4/6. However, it will break down if the prior is perturbed.
Therefore the SCF will not be OBIC with respect to these perturbed priors. These
observations provide an intuition for our results, both positive and negative. In
the uniform priors case, the position in which various outcomes occur in the rect-
angular array which represents the SCF, is (relatively) unimportant because only
frequencies of occurrence matter. However, in the generic case these positions are
critical - alternatives must “line up” in very speciﬁc ways in order to satisfy OBIC.
These restrictions precipitate a negative result.
We employ a general version of the arguments above to prove Theorem 4.1. We
deﬁne the set C of independent beliefs to be the product of marginal distributions
over preference types satisfying the following property: if the probability that a
voter’s type belongs to a set S equals the probability that his type belongs to the
18set T, then we must have S = T. This is clearly violated (in the most extreme
way) when the marginal distribution is uniform. But it is clearly generic in the set
of all independent beliefs.
Now consider voter i and preference orderings Pi and ¯ Pi for this voter with
the property that the set of the ﬁrst k (k is an integer between 1 and m − 1)
ranked alternatives in the two orderings are identical. Denote the set of these ﬁrst
k alternatives by B. For instance, in Example 3.1, if the two orderings for the
row voter are abc and acb, then k = 1 and B = {a}; if the orderings are abc and
bac, then k = 2 and B = {a,b} etc. Let f be a SCF which is OBIC with respect
to some belief lying in the set C. Let S be the set of preferences of voters other
than i, P−i such that f(Pi,P−i) ∈ B. Similarly let T be the set of all P−i such
that f( ¯ Pi,P−i) ∈ B. Using the argument outlined earlier, we can conclude (from
OBIC) that the probability measures of the sets S and T must be the same. But
since beliefs lie in the set C, the sets S and T must be the same. Therefore, if
f(Pi,P−i) ∈ B, then f( ¯ Pi,P−i)) ∈ B.
This last condition is a montonicity type of condition on SCFs. Although we
are unable to show directly that it implies strategy-proofness, we demonstrate that
together with unanimity, it implies dictatorship. The proof proceeds by induction
on the number of voters. We show that it holds for two voters and then use a
“cloning” of voters argument to establish the induction step.
It is clear that Theorem 4.1 depends heavily on the requirement that the ex-
pected utility from truth telling is at least as great as that from lying for various
cardinalizations of true preferences. A natural question is whether all cardinaliza-
tions are required for the result i.e. whether the full force of OBIC is necessary. We
can provide a fairly clear answer to this question. Reexamining previous arguments
we can verify the following: for any preference ordering and any alternative not
ranked last, we require cardinalizations which make the utility gap beteween the
weak better-than set (with respect to this alternative) and the strictly worse-than
19set, as large as possible. For instance, if the utility of the best and worst alter-
natives are normalized to be one and zero respectively, then for all alternatives
x and all real numbers δ ∈ (0,1), there must exist a cardinalization u such that
u(x) − u(y) > δ where y is the alternative ranked immediately below x. If there
are exactly three alternatives, then all cardinalizations of each preference ordering
are indeed required. However, this is not necessary if there are more than three
alternatives.
It is worth pointing out an important feature of the set of beliefs C that we con-
struct. For all marginal distributions derived from beliefs in this set, all preference
orderings gets strictly positive probability. To see this, consider the two person
three alternative example once again and suppose that µ1 = 0. Then µ1 +µ2 = µ2
so that the probabilities that the column voter’s type belongs to the distinct sets
{abc,acb} and {abc} are the same. This implies that admissible beliefs are such that
no domain restriction is introduced. Observe that such a requirement is necessary
because it is possible to construct strategy-proof SCFs over restricted domains.
Finally we would like to make an observation that may be of help in interpreting
our result. We know that if we require a SCF to be robust in the sense of being
incentive compatible with respect to all beliefs, we are, in eﬀect, imposing strategy-
proofness. We then immediately obtain dictatorship. In fact, we may not need
robustness with respect to all beliefs - even a local version of this requirement may
be suﬃcient (Ledyard (1978)). Our results suggests that a related negative result
obtains when robustness is imposed not on beliefs but on utility representations.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the implications of weakening the incentive requirement in the
standard voting model from dominant strategies to ordinal Bayesian incentive com-
patibility. The set of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible social choice functions
20clearly depends on the beliefs of each agent. A case of particular interest is the
case of uniform priors. We provide a weak suﬃcient condition for incentive com-
patibility and show that a large class of well-behaved social choice functions satisfy
these conditions. However, we show that these possibility results vanish if we per-
turb these beliefs. We are thus unable to escape the negative conclusion of the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for generic priors.
Several questions remain to be answered. Although OBIC is a natural concept
in an ordinal setting, it is a reasonably strong requirement. It is vital there-
fore, to investigate a fully cardinal model where the value of a SCF can depend
on the cardinalization of individual preferences. It would also be worthwhile to
examine the eﬀects of correlation in the voting model as has been done, quite ex-
tensively in models with money and quasi-linear utility functions (see for instance,
d’Aspremont, Cr´ emer and G´ erard-Varet (2002). We hope to address some of these
issues in future work.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1: The proof proceeds in several steps. In Step 1, we
deﬁne the sets C and show that they are open and dense subsets of ∆I and the
Lebesgue measure of their complement sets are zero. In Step 2, we show that if f
is OBIC with respect to the belief µ where µ ∈ C, then f must satisfy a certain
property which we call Property M. In Steps 3 and 4, we show by induction on the
22number of individuals that a SCF which satisﬁes Property M must be dictatorial.
In Step 3, we show that this is true in the case of two individuals. In Step 4, we
complete the induction step.
STEP 1
We deﬁne the set C below.
For any Q ⊆ I P N, let µ(Q) =
P
P∈Q
µ(P). The set C is deﬁned as the set of beliefs
µ satisfying the following property: for all Q,T ⊂ I P N
[µ(Q) = µ(T)] ⇒ [Q = T]




Observe that φ(µ) > 0. Since φ is a continuous function of µ, there exists  > 0
such that for all ˆ µ ∈ ∆I with d(ˆ µ,µ) < , 2 we have φ(ˆ µ) > 0. But this implies
that ˆ µ ∈ C. Therefore C is open in ∆N.
We now show that ∆I − C has Lebesgue measure zero. We begin with the
observation that ∆I is the Cartesian product of N simplices each of which is of
dimension m! − 1. On the other hand,
∆





Therefore the set ∆I − C is the union of a ﬁnite number of hypersurfaces in-
tersected with ∆I. It follows immediately that it is a set of lower dimension and
hence has zero Lebesgue measure.
Pick µ ∈ ∆I − C and consider an open neighbourhood of radius  > 0 with
centre µ. Since this neighbourhood has strictly positive measure and since ∆I −C
2d(.,.) here signiﬁes Euclidean distance
23has measure zero, it must be the case that the neighbourhood has a non-empty
intersection with the set C. This establishes that C is dense in ∆I.
This completes Step 1.
STEP 2
Let f be a SCF which is OBIC with respect to the belief µ ∈ C. Our goal in
this step of the proof is to show that f must satisfy Property M which we deﬁne
below.
Let P be a preference proﬁle, let i be an individual and let P 0
i be an ordering
such that the top k elements in Pi coincide with the top k elements of P 0
i. Then
Property M requires that if f(P) is one of the top k elements of Pi, then the
f(P 0
i,P−i) must also be one of these top k elements. Formally,
Definition 8.1 The SCF f satisﬁes Property M, if for all individuals i, for all
integers k = 1,2,···,m, for all P−i and for all Pi,P 0




[f(Pi,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi)] ⇒ [f(P 0
i,P−i) ∈ B(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i)]
In order to establish Step 2, we ﬁrst need to prove an intermediate result.
Let µ ∈ ∆I and i ∈ I. Then µ−i and µi denote respectively, the induced (con-
ditional) probability over preferences of individuals other than i and the marginal
distribution over i’s preferences. Thus µ−i(P−i) will denote the probability that
individuals other than i have preferences P−i. Similarly µi(Pi) will denote the
probability that i’s preference is Pi.
Lemma 8.1 Let µ ∈ C. Then, for all for all Q,T ⊂ I P N−1
[µ−i(Q) = µ−i(T)] ⇒ [Q = T]
24Proof: Suppose not. Then there exists µ ∈ C and Q,T ⊂ I P N−1 with Q and




µ(Q × {Pi}) = µ(T × {Pi})
Since Q and T are distinct Q × {Pi} and T × {Pi} are also distinct. But this
contradicts the assumption that µ ∈ C.
We now complete the proof of Step 2. Let i be an individual and let Pi and
P 0
i be such that B(rk(Pi),Pi) = B(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i). Suppose i’s “true” preference is Pi.




i,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi)}) (12)
Suppose i’s “true” preference is P 0













Since B(rk(Pi),Pi) = B(rk(P 0
i),P 0









Since µ ∈ C, it follows from Lemma 9.1 and equation (14) that







25Now suppose for some Pi, we have f(Pi,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi). Then equation (15)
implies that f(P 0
i,P−i) ∈ B(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i). Thus Property M is satisﬁed and Step 2
is complete.
STEP 3
In this step, we show that in a two-person SCF which satisﬁes Property M must
be dictatorial. Let N = {1,2} and let f satisfy Property M.
CLAIM B: For all proﬁles (P1,P2), either f(P1,P2) = r1(P1) or f(P1,P2) =
r1(P2) must hold.
Suppose that the Claim is false. Let (P1,P2) be a proﬁle where individual 1’s
ﬁrst-ranked alternative is a, individual 2’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative is b and suppose
f(P1,P2) = c where c is distinct from a and b. Consider an ordering ¯ P2 where
a is ranked ﬁrst and b is ranked second. By unanimity, f(P1, ¯ P2) = a. Consider
an ordering P 0
2 where b is ranked ﬁrst and a second. Observe that the top two
elements in the orderings ¯ P2 and P 0
2 coincide. Moreover, f(P1, ¯ P2) is one of these
top two elements. It follows therefore from Property M that f(P1,P 0
2) ∈ {a,b}.
Now suppose that f(P1,P 0
2) = b. Since P2 and P 0
2 have the same top element,
Property M implies that f(P1,P2) = b which contradicts our supposition that the
outcome at this proﬁle is c. Therefore f(P1,P 0
2) = a.
Let P 0
1 be an ordering where a and b are ranked ﬁrst and second respectively.
Since P1 has the same top element as P 0




Now consider the proﬁle (P 0
1,P2). By considering an ordering ¯ P1 where b
is ranked ﬁrst and a second, we can duplicate an earlier argument to conclude
that f(P 0
1,P2) is either a or b. But if it is b, then Property M would imply that
26f(P 0
1,P 0
2) = b which would contradict our earlier conclusion that the outcome at
this proﬁle is a. Therefore f(P 0
1,P2) = a. But then Property M would imply that
f(P1,P2) = a whereas we have assumed that the outcome at this proﬁle is c. This
proves the Claim.
CLAIM C: If f picks 1’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative at a proﬁle where 1 and 2’s
ﬁrst-ranked outcomes are distinct then f picks 1’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative at all
proﬁles.
Let (P1,P2) be a proﬁle where the ﬁrst-ranked alternatives according to P1 and
P2 are a and b respectively. It follows from Claim B that f(P1,P2) is either a or b.
Assume without loss of generality that it is a. Holding P2 ﬁxed, observe that the
outcome for all proﬁles where a is ranked ﬁrst for 1 must be a, otherwise Property
M will be violated. By a similar argument, holding P1 ﬁxed, the outcome b can
never be obtained in all those proﬁles where 2’s top-ranked outcome is b. Now
consider an arbitrary proﬁle where a is ranked ﬁrst for 1 and b for 2. Using Claim
B and the arguments above, it follows that the outcome must be a.
Consider an outcome c distinct from a and b. In view of the arguments in the
previous paragraph, we can assume without loss of generality that c is second-
ranked under P1. Let P 0
1 be an ordering where c and a are ﬁrst and second ranked
respectively. Property M implies that f(P 0
1,P2) is either a or c. But Claim B
requires the outcome at this proﬁle to be either b or c. Therefore f(P 0
1,P2) = c.
Applying the arguments in the previous paragraph, it follows that f always picks
1’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative whenever 2’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative is b.
Let (P1,P2) be a proﬁle where a and b are ﬁrst-ranked in P1 and P2 respectively.
Pick an alternative x distinct from a and b. Applying earlier arguments, we can
assume that x is second-ranked in P2. Let P 0
2 be an ordering where x is ﬁrst and
27b is second ranked. It follows from Claim B that f(P1,P 0
2) is either x or a. But
if it is x Property M would imply that f(P1,P2) would either be b or x which
we know to be false. Therefore f(P1,P 0
2) = a. Replicating earlier arguments, it
follows that the outcome at any proﬁle is 1’s ﬁrst-ranked altrenative provided that
2’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative is x. Since x is arbitrary, the Claim is proved.
It follows immediately from Claim C that f must be dictatorial. Therefore Step
3 is complete.
STEP 4
We now complete the induction step. Pick an integer N with N > 2. We
assume the following:
For all K with K ≤ N, if f : I P
K → A satisﬁes Property M, then f is dictatorial.
Our goal is to prove:
If f : I P
N → A satisﬁes Property M then f is dictatorial.
Let f : I P N → A be a SCF that satisﬁes Property M. Deﬁne a SCF g : I P N−1 →
A as follows. For all (P1,P3,P4,···,PN) ∈ I P N−1,
g(P1,P3,P4,···,PN) = f(P1,P1,P3,···,PN)
The idea behind this construction is simple and appears frequently in the literature
on strategy-proofness, for example in Sen (2001). Individuals 1 and 2 are “cloned”
to form a single individual in the SCF g. This coalesced individual in g will be
referred to as {1,2}.
It is trivial to verify that g satisﬁes unanimity. We will show that g sat-
isﬁes Property M. Pick an individual i and suppose Pi and P 0
i are such that
B(rk(Pi),Pi) = B(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i) for some integer k which lies between 1 and m. Fur-
ther, suppose that for some proﬁle P−i ∈ I P N−2, we have g(Pi,P−i) ∈ B(rk(Pi),Pi).
We will show that g(P 0
i,P−i) ∈ B(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i). Observe that if i is an individ-
28ual from the set {3,···,N}, then this follows immediately from our assumption
that f satisﬁes Property M. The only non-obvious case is the one where i is
the coalesced individual {1,2}. In this case, observe that since f satisﬁes Prop-




i) which in turn implies that f(P 0
1,P 0




1,P3,···,PN) ∈ B(rk(P 0
i),P 0
i) which is what was required to be
proved.
Since g satisﬁes Property M, our induction assumption implies that g is dicta-
torial. There are two cases which will be considered separately.
CASE I: The dictator is the cloned individual {1,2}. Thus whenever individ-
uals 1 and 2 have the same preferences, the outcome under f is the ﬁrst-ranked
alternative according to this common preference ordering.
Fix an N − 2 person proﬁle (P3,P4,···,PN) ∈ I P N−2 and deﬁne a two-person
SCF h : I P 2 → A as follows: for all (P1,P2) ∈ I P 2,
h(P1,P2) = f(P1,P2,P3,···,PN)
Since {1,2} is a dictator, h satisﬁes unanimity. Since f satisﬁes Property M, it
follows immediately that h also satisﬁes Property M. From Step 3, it follows that
h is dictatorial. Assume without loss of generality that this dictator is 1. We now
show that 1 is a dictator in f. In other words, the identity of the dictator in h
does not depend on (P3,P4,···,PN).
Let j ∈ {3,4,···,N} and suppose that there exists an N − 2 person proﬁle
(P1,···,PN) where j can change the identity of the dictator in h (say from 1 to
2) by changing his preferences from Pj to P 0
j. We shall show that this is not
possible when Pj and P 0
j diﬀer only over a pair of alternatives. This is suﬃcient
to prove the general case because the change from Pj to P 0
j can be decomposed
into a sequence of changes where successive preferences along the sequence diﬀer
29only over a pair of alternatives. Assume therefore that there exists a pair x,y such
that rk(Pj) = x, rk+1(Pj) = y and rk(P 0
j) = y, rk+1(P 0
j) = x. Moreover for any
alternative z distinct from x and y, its rank in Pj and P 0
j is the same. Consider the
proﬁle P = (P1,P2,P3,···,Pj,···,PN) where P1 and P2 have distinct ﬁrst-ranked
alternatives. Then individual j by switching from Pj to P 0
j changes the outcome.
Observe that Pj and P 0
j have the same top s elements where s = 1,2,···,k −
1,k + 1,···,m. Since f satisﬁes Property M, it follows that f(P) and f(P 0
j,P−j)
can diﬀer only if f(P) = f(Pj,P−j) ∈ {x,y}. But f(Pj,P−j) ∈ {x,y} implies
that f(P 0
j,P−j) ∈ {x,y}. The above statement again follows from the fact that f
satisﬁes Property M. Now pick P1 and P2 such that the ﬁrst-ranked alternatives in
these two orderings is x and z respectively where z is distinct from x and y. Since j
changes the identity of the dictatator in h from 1 to 2, it follows that f(P 0
j,P−j) = z
which contradicts our earlier claim that f(P 0
j,P−j) ∈ {x,y}. Therefore j cannot
change the identity of the dictator in h by changing his preferences. Therefore the
dictator in h is the dictator in f.
CASE II: The dictator in g is an individual j ∈ {3,···,N}. Assume without
loss of generality that j = 3. Now deﬁne a N − 1 person SCF g0 by coalescing
individuals 1 and 3 rather than 1 and 2 as in g. Of course, g0 satisﬁes unanimity
and Property M. Therefore it is dictatorial (by the induction hypothesis). If the
dictator is the coalesced individual {1,3}, then Case I applies and we can conclude
that f is dictatorial. Suppose therefore that {1,3} is not the dictator. We will
show that this is impossible. We consider two subcases.
CASE IIa: The dictator in g0 is an individual j ∈ {4,···,N}. Assume with-
out loss of generality that j = 4. In this subcase, when 1 and 2 have the same
preferences, the outcome under f is 3’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative but when 1 and 3
agree, the outcome is 4’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative. Consider an N person proﬁle P
30where P1 = P2 = P3. Let a be the ﬁrst-ranked alternative of this ordering. Let
the ﬁrst ranked alternative in P4 be b which is distinct from a. Since 1 and 2’s
orderings coincide, f(P) must be individual 3’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative which is a.
On the other hand, since 1 and 3’s orderings coincide, f(P) must be individual 4’s
ﬁrst ranked alternative which is b. We have a contradiction.
CASE IIb: The dictator in g0 is individual 2. Let P be an N-person proﬁle
where P1 = P3 and aP1bP1cP1x for all x 6= a,b,c. Also let bP2aP2cP2x for all
x 6= a,b,c and let P2 agree with P1 for all x 6= a,b,c Since 1 and 3 have the
same ordering in P, f(P) = b. Let P 0
3 be the ordering obtained by switching
b and c in P3. Since P3 and P 0
3 agree on the top and the top three elements,
Property M implies that f(P 0
3,P−3) ∈ {b,c}. Suppose that this outcome is c.
Then observe that Property M implies that f(P1,P1,P 0
3,···,PN) = c. But since
1 and 2’s orderings coincide, the outcome at this proﬁle should be 3’s ﬁrst-ranked
alternative a. Therefore f(P 0
3,P−3) = b. Now let ¯ P3 be the ordering obtained
by switching a and c in P 0
3. Property M implies that f(P1,P2, ¯ P3,···,PN) = b.
A further application of Property M for individual 2 allows us to conclude that
f(P1,P1, ¯ P3,···,PN) ∈ {a,b}. But 1 and 2 have the same ordering at this proﬁle
so that the outcome here must be 3’s ﬁrst-ranked alternative which is c. We have
obtained a contradiction.
This concludes Step 4 and the proof of the Theorem.
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